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Abstract— This paper analyzes the European Court of Human 
Rights’ ruling in the Cestaro v. Italy case, focusing specifically 
on the conviction for violation of Article 3 of the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamen-
tal Freedoms by Italian criminal law, whose framework does 
not recognize torture as a crime and does not provide instru-
ments of deterrence to effectively prevent the execution and the 
recurrence of such acts. 
Currently, the Italian Parliament is discussing a draft amend-
ment to the Criminal Code and aims to introduce the concept 
of torture as a crime; however, in the light of comments made 
by the European Court of Human Rights, this project questions 
whether the proposed solution will be able to prevent a repeat 
of events similar to those that occurred in 2001 after the G8 
Summit in Genoa. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In a limited government, the preeminent and unsur-
passed value is the respect for human dignity: thus, torture 
has no place either in legalized forms or through practices 
more or less silent [1]. 
For these reasons, all international and supranational 
charters of rights, ratified also by the Italian State, have es-
tablished both the prohibition of torture and the legal proce-
dures to follow when torture is apparent: from the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 and the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms (European Convention) of 1950, to the 
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), adopted by the 
United Nations in 1984, its Optional Protocol of New York 
of 2002 and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Euro-
pean Union of 2000a. 
                                                          
a The Italian State is a signatory of other international charters which en-
shrine the prohibition of torture and, in particular, the Geneva Convention 
According to the prevailing legal literature [2] and 
some judicial pronouncementsb, the prohibition of torture is 
also a norm of general international law and, in particular, 
ius cogens [3] valid for all states in the international commu-
nity, regardless of its express provision through agreements 
[4]. 
Nevertheless and although the Italian Constitution 
states that «Any acts of physical or moral violence against 
persons subject to restrictions of personal liberty are to be 
punished» (art. 3, § 4) [5], the Italian State has not yet intro-
duced the crime of torture in criminal law, contrary to the 
express provisions of art. 1 of the CAT [6] and art. 3 (Prohi-
bition of Torture) of the European Convention [7]. For years, 
the Committee against Torturec of the United Nations and the 
Committee for the Prevention of Tortured , a body of the 
Council of Europe, have repeatedly criticised and denounced 
this omission [8] while the European Court of Human Rights 
                                                                                                  
relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 1949, the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966, the European Convention 
for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment of 
1987, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court of 1998. 
b Cf., e. g., International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsi-
ble for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in 
the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, 10th December 1998, 
case no. IT-95-17/1, Prosecutor v. Anto Furundžija (§ 144 ff.), and Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights, 21st November 2001, Application no. 
35763/97, case of Al-Adsan v. The United Kingdom. The General Assem-
bly of the United Nations took note of the customary nature of the prohibi-
tion of torture in the Resolution 61/53 on Torture and other Cruel, Inhu-
man or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 19th December 2006. 
c  Cf. Report of the Committee against Torture, 1st December 2007 
(A/62/44, § 40 C), where the Committee reiterated its previous recommen-
dation (A/54/44, § 169 a) «that the State party proceed to incorporate into 
domestic law the crime of torture and adopt a definition of torture that 
covers all the elements contained in article 1 of the Convention. The State 
party should also ensure that these offences are punished by appropriate 
penalties which take into account their grave nature, as set out in article 4, 
paragraph 2, of the Convention». 
d Cf. Report to the Italian Government on the visit to Italy carried out by 
the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment from 13rd to 25th May 2012, p. 8 
(Strasbourg, 19th November 2013). 
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(ECHR) has ascertained on several occasions the responsibil-
ity of the Italian State for the violation of the absolute prohi-
bition of torture and the use of inhuman or degrading treat-
mente. 
The ECHR ruling in the Cestaro v. Italy case, passed 
the 7th April 2015, is a further condemnation of the Italian 
State not only for the substantive violation of art. 3 of the 
European Convention, but also for the lack of an effective 
criminal law to persecute the acts of torture committed. 
 
II. FACTS AND DECISIONS OF EUROPEAN COURT OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS 
In its ruling, the ECHR unanimously agreed that there 
had been a violation of art. 3 of the European Convention on 
account of ill-treatment sustained by the applicant during 
events which occurred at the end of the G8 Summit in Genoa 
in July 2001 in the Diaz-Pertini School, whose building was 
made available at the time by the municipal authorities for 
demonstrators to use as a night shelter. On the nights of the 
21st and the 22nd of July an anti-riot police unit entered the 
building to carry out a search, leading to acts of violence. 
A. The material violation of art. 3 of the Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms 
First of all, the ECHR refers to the definitionf of torture 
contained in the CAT and the evolution of this concept in the 
case law of the Court itselfg: in the light of this reconstruc-
tion, the ECHR ruled that the violence committed in the Di-
az-Pertini School, of which the applicant is a victim, had a 
punitive end as well as being an act of retaliation aimed to 
cause humiliation, pain and suffering of the victims. There-
fore, these forms of violence have the characteristics of real 
torture, pursuant to art. 1 of the CATh. 
The violence inflicted on the applicant were particular-
ly serious acts of cruelty, because it was completely gratui-
tous as the victim did not pose any resistance: i.e., the police 
                                                          
e The first conviction by the ECHR is the ruling of the 6th April 2000, Ap-
plication no. 26772/95, case of Labita v. Italy. After this one, the ECHR 
found a violation of art. 3 of the European Convention by the Italian State 
in a growing number of cases: recently, it can recall the rulings of the sec-
ond Section of the 31st July 2012, Application no. 40020/03, case of M. and 
Others v. Italy and Bulgaria, and the 8th January 2013, Applications no. 
43517/09, 46882/09, 55400/09, 57875/09, 61535/09, 35315/10 and 
37818/10, case of Torreggiani and Others v. Italy. 
f The art. 1, § 1, states that «For the purposes of this Convention, the term 
"torture" means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical 
or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtain-
ing from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him 
for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having 
committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any 
reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is 
inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a 
public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not 
include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to 
lawful sanctions.» 
g Cestaro v. Italy, § 171 ff. 
h Ibidem, § 177 ff. 
abused their position of power, and committed a deliberate 
and premeditated act, devoid of any foundation i . This is 
demonstrated not only by punitive irruption into the Diaz-
Pertini School, but also by the subsequent efforts of the na-
tional authorities to justify the search of premises and arrests 
on the basis of false evidence, e.g. simulating the discovery 
in the courtyard of the School of two Molotov cocktailsj. 
As a result, the ECHR ruled that all the facts indicate 
that the treatment contrary to human dignity suffered by the 
applicant should be qualified as torture k. 
B. The infringement of article 3 of the Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
on the procedural side 
According to the case law of the ECHR, a mere com-
pensation is not enough to overcome the victim status; in-
stead, it is necessary to punish those responsible for acts of 
torture l. In this way, the ECHR identifies the second aspect 
of the responsibility of the Italian State in accordance with 
the procedural requirements of art. 3 of the European Con-
vention: indeed, each contracting country has to carry out 
effective investigations into all cases of material breach of 
this article, in order to identify, prosecute and convict ac-
cordingly those responsible for acts of torture and inhuman 
or degrading treatmentm. 
The ECHR states that only the Italian judicial authori-
ties can sanction sentence reductions or legal allowances for 
perpetrators of torture: however, pursuant to Art. 19 of the 
European Convention and in accordance with the principle 
that the Convention is both a theoretical and practical guar-
antee, the ECHR rules that it must monitor and intervene 
when there is a clear discrepancy between the gravity of the 
act and the penalty imposedn. Moreover, in cases of torture 
committed by state officials, criminal proceedings should 
never become extinct through the statute of limitation, while 
amnesty and pardon should never be granted for this type of 
crime nor should the sentence be suspendedo. 
It is therefore necessary that each contracting state to 
the European Convention introduces provisions of criminal 
law, in accordance with the provisions of art. 3 of the Euro-
pean Convention, while, in terms of disciplinary measures, 
the ECHR considers that, when the perpetrators are state 
officials, it is important that these are suspended during the 
period of investigation and trial and are permanently re-
moved if convictedp. 
In the present case, the ECHR has found a number of 
violations of the positive obligations under art. 3 of the Eu-
                                                          
i Ibidem, § 179 ff. 
j Ibidem, § 184. 
k Ibidem, § 190. 
l Ibidem, § 230 ff. 
m Ibidem, § 204 ff. 
n Ibidem, § 207. 
o Ibidem, § 208. 
p Ibidem, § 209. 
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ropean Convention: the police did not cooperate with the 
investigating authorities to identify the perpetrators of vio-
lence and the Italian Government has yet to respond to re-
quests for information regarding the necessary suspension 
from duty of police officers subjected to criminal proceed-
ingsq. 
In any case, the most serious aspect is the impunity of 
the authors: the defendants were sentenced to prison terms 
by the national courts for minor offences of forgery commit-
ted with the intent to conceal the facts of torture, while with 
relation to offences of intentional injury, beatings, private 
violence and abuse of office, they have benefited from the 
limitation of actions and a sentence reduction as determined 
by the pardon governed by Law no. 241/2006r. 
Consequently, the ECHR found that the authorities 
were incompetent in their response to such serious acts: 
however, this result cannot be imputed to the shortcomings 
or negligence of the public prosecutor’s office or the domes-
tic courtss. The problem has a structural nature: the present 
case had proved that the Italian criminal legislation does not 
recognize torture and is devoid of the necessary deterrent 
effect to prevent other similar violations of art. 3 in the fu-
turet. 
The ECHR pointed out that the State’s positive obliga-
tions under art. 3 of the European Convention include the 
duty to introduce a properly adapted legal framework, in-
cluding effective criminal-law provisions u . Therefore, the 
ECHR concluded that the Italian legal system should be en-
dowed with the legal means to ensure the appropriate pun-
ishment of perpetrators of acts of torture or other ill-
treatment under art. 3 of the European Convention and be 
empowered to prevent perpetrators of torture benefiting from 
measures of relief that are contrary to the Court’s case-lawv. 
 
III. THE BILL BEFORE PARLIAMENT 
The Italian Parliament must then recognize torture as a 
crime, without delay, in order to ensure effective respect for 
human dignity and prevent the further compromise of the 
Italian State’s international credibility. 
The bill before Parliamentw includes an introduction to 
the concept of torture as a crime under art. 613-bis of the 
Penal Code: «Anyone, with violence or threat or violation of 
his obligations of protection, care and assistance, intention-
ally causes a person entrusted to him, or at least under his 
authority, supervision or custody, acute physical or mental 
                                                          
q Ibidem, § 214 ff. and § 227 ff. 
r Ibidem, § 219 ff. 
s Ibidem, § 222 ff. 
t Ibidem, § 225. 
u Ibidem, § 243. 
v Ibidem, § 246. 
w The bill no. 2168 was approved by the Chamber of Deputies on 9th April 
2015 and is currently before the Senate of the Republic. 
suffering in order to obtain information or statements, or as 
a form of punishment, or as a means to curb resistance, or 
for any reason based on ethnicity, sexual orientation or po-
litical or religious opinions, shall be punished with impris-
onment from four to ten years. If the facts mentioned in the 
first paragraph are committed by a public official or a per-
son responsible for a public service, with abuse of authority, 
or in violation of the duties inherent to the function or ser-
vice, the applied punishment will be imprisonment from 
five to fifteen years.»x 
The bill provides for the introduction of aggravating 
circumstances if the acts committed lead to the unintended 
consequence of death, establishing an increase of two-thirds 
of the sentence; while, if the perpetrator intentionally causes 
death, the penalty is life imprisonment. 
Moreover, art. 613-ter introduces the crime of instiga-
tion of a public official to commit torture. 
While the sentencing for the crime of torture is subject 
to a statute of limitation, the period of time within which 
proceedings must be instituted doubles penalty prescribed 
by the law: therefore, the crime of torture is extinguished 
after a period of 20 years, or after 30 years when it is com-
mitted by a public official or a person responsible for a pub-
lic service. 
The bill also enshrines the ban on the use of state-
ments obtained through the crime of torture and the prohibi-
tion to expel or return migrants when it is assumed that, in 
the countries of origin, they are subjected to torture. Finally, 
diplomatic agents under investigation or sentence in their 
country of origin for this offence would be stripped of their 
diplomatic immunity. 
 
IV. CRITICAL CONSIDERATIONS TO THE DRAFT LAW 
The legislature would introduce a wider configuration 
of the crime of torture than required by the CAT because, 
next to the most serious offence committed by a public offi-
cial or a person responsible for a public service (§ 2), the 
crime of torture committed by private persons is also con-
templated (§ 1). This solution is satisfactory because it would 
respect fully the positive obligations of prevention that each 
State party must comply to, in accordance with art. 3 of the 
European Convention. 
However, the legislature still fails to address all aspects 
of torture. 
First, the provision of the law before Parliament cir-
cumscribes the victims of the crime only to the people en-
trusted to the police officer, or otherwise subjected to his 
authority, supervision or custody, thus excluding the possi-
bility of recognizing the existence of the offence, in the case 
of serious violence, freely aimed at causing the victims’ suf-
fering, perpetrated by the police in the operations of public 
policy before the victims are under the authority of the po-
                                                          
x Trans. mine. 
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lice. This provision would therefore fail to recognize in-
stances of torture similar to the acts committed in the Diaz-
Pertini School, a case that only became classified as torture 
once it was recognized as such by the ECHR. As a result, this 
provision would not be able to punish and prevent the com-
mission of new facts similar to those condemned by the 
ECHR. However, it would expose Italy to further future in-
ternational responsibilities because the proposed solution 
would be inconsistent with the obligations under the CAT. 
Another critical point is the description of the conduct 
because the provision requires the use of "violence or threat": 
torture is often performed without the use of these modes, so 
it would be preferable to structure the offence to "free form" 
as required by the CAT. 
Similarly, the request for a specific intent, i.e. the fact 
that the performed behavior aimed for a specific purpose, 
fails to identify cases of intentional infliction of physical or 
moral suffering executed without any apparent purpose, but 
only for revenge or sadism: just think, once again, of the 
events of the Diaz-Pertini School. 
With regards to offences that are committed by a public 
official or a person responsible for a public service, the legis-
lature still does not rule out possible allowances for the ac-
cused on the basis of extenuating circumstances, even though 
it does outline an appropriate maximum penalty. Conse-
quently, those responsible for these crimes could benefit 
from reduced sentences. 
Finally, the draft law does not exclude the applicability 
of exoneration, in contrast with the provisions of the CAT 
(art. 2, §§ 2 and 3), nor does it preclude the statute of limita-
tion and the applicability of amnesty or pardon, unlike the 
reconstruction rooted in case law of the ECHR. In fact, ac-
cording to the international order, the condemnation of tor-
ture has an absolute and imperative value because neither a 
state of war, threat of war nor internal political instability can 
be invoked as a justification for torture (CAT, art. 2, § 2): the 
prohibition of torture does not allow exceptions, limitations, 
compensations, nor any derogation (European Convention, 
art. 15, § 2)y [10]. 
 
V. EVALUATION SUMMARY 
The legal literature has emphasized that the use of tor-
ture and inhuman or degrading treatment - along with author-
itarian tendencies, the return to forms of racism and the ab-
sence of standards of social equity - are an index of the re-
gressive nature of time, characterized in that «rights seem to 
                                                          
y The ECHR, in the case of Khashiyev and Akayeva v. Russia, Section I, 
24th February 2005 (Applications no. 57942/00 and 57945/00), ruled that 
«article 3 enshrines one of the most fundamental values of democratic 
societies. Even in the most difficult circumstances, such as the fight against 
terrorism and organized crime, the Convention prohibits in absolute terms 
torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Unlike most of 
the substantive clauses of the Convention and its Protocols, Article 3 makes 
no provision for exceptions and no derogation from it is permissible under 
Article 15, § 2 even in the event of a public emergency threatening the life 
of the nation» (§ 170). 
"have a price": the price of so-called public safety» [11]. 
It is a sort of inversion of values: the guarantee of 
freedoms and fundamental rights, at times, is seen as an ob-
stacle to the protection of other values considered to be more 
important such as security. Ensuring security is no longer 
understood as functional to the protection of fundamental 
rights, instead, in sharp contrast with these, it is used to ex-
plain the recent debate on the legalization of torture [12]. 
National interest is reacquiring prevalence over the founding 
principles of the rule of law [13]. 
In addition to these reasons that characterize the poli-
cy choices of many countries, there are other explanations 
for the delay in the recognition of torture as a crime in Italian 
law: the express provision of this offence would be capable 
of eroding the impunity still enjoyed by some officials and 
public officers. There are additional reasons: policies target-
ed at illegal or undocumented immigrants would need to be 
abandoned and the current penitentiary system would also 
need to be reviewed. 
Nevertheless, in a Constitutional State of Law, the 
dignity of each individual is the supreme value, meaning that 
they cannot be treated as a means to achieve an end that 
transcends them: therefore, torture and inhuman or degrading 
treatment can never be justified because they dehumanize 
both the victims and the perpetrators. 
Torture is a brutal and disturbing reality, more or less 
hidden and close to home [14], yet while it is often ignored, 
it is an issue that must be addressed in the social, political 
and legal spheres, and accompanied by a comprehensive 
public campaign to inform on its associated risks. 
The stance on torture determined by domestic [15] 
and international courts is essential to prevent human rights 
from being eroded, but it is also necessary that the principles 
of inviolability of the person and of human dignity become 
ingrained in cultural and social consciousness. Only then will 
torture and inhuman or degrading treatment be perceived as 
non-justifiable under any circumstances. 
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